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Tax Reform Commissions in the Sweep of
California's Fiscal History
by STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN*
Introduction
On September 29, 2009, the California Commission on the 21st
Century ("Parsky Commission")' submitted to Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger and the Legislature its recommendations for
reforming the California tax system.2 When the Governor and the
Legislature first appointed the Parsky Commission, there were very
high expectations. California was experiencing a severe financial
crisis, following on the heels of ongoing budgetary problems and a
national recession. Many hoped that the Parsky Commission could
provide some direction out of the crisis. There were broad
indications that the recommendations of the Parsky Commission
would be taken very seriously in Sacramento and would be
considered seriously by the Legislature.3
The Parsky Commission proposed a very bold plan, introducing a
new tax called the Business Net Receipts Tax ("BNRT") and using
the proceeds from that tax to finance large reductions in personal
* Executive Director, Murphy Institute and Professor of Economics, Tulane
University; smsheffrin@tulane.edu.
1. The Chairman of the Commission was Gerald Parsky, former Chair of the U.C.
Regents and one-time head of the California Republican Party.
2. Press Release, California Commission on the 21st Century, Commission on the
21st Century Economy, Commission on the 21st Century Economy Issues
Recommendations to Modernize, Stabilize & Simplify California's Outdated Tax System
(Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/reports/documents/
FinalReport-PressRelease.pdf.
3. Press Release, Office of Governor Schwarzenegger, Gov. Schwarzenegger and
Legislative Leaders Announce Appointments to Bipartisan Commission on the 21st
Century Economy (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-
release/11233/.
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income tax rates and to outright eliminate the corporation tax and
general state sales tax.4 The Parsky Commission's report devoted 337
of its 425 pages to specific bill language for its proposal, complete
with detailed phase-in provisions, so that the Legislature could
seriously consider the proposal as drafted At the press conference
announcing the report, there were pre-arranged endorsements from
former Governor Gray Davis, former United States Secretary of
State George Schultz, Senator Dianne Feinstein, and former
legislator Willie Brown.6 At the same press conference, Governor
Schwarzenegger urged its passage.
Outside of this group, however, the report was criticized heavily.
Only nine of the fourteen members of the Parsky Commission signed
on to its recommendations. One of those opposing the report was
William Hauck, a gubernatorial appointee and Chairman of the
California Business Roundtable.7 Two of the members, Professor of
Law Richard Pomp, and former legislator and Treasurer of the
County of Santa Cruz, Fred Keeley, were vehemently critical both of
the substance of the report itself and the operation of the Parsky
Commission.8 Groups representing labor and business were united in
their opposition.9 The California Chamber of Commerce strongly
opposed the report. Tax expert Jean Ross of the California Budget
Project, a liberal think tank, was critical of virtually all of the
4. COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY, FINAL REPORT (Sept. 2009),
available at http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/reports/documents/Commission on-the_
21stCent uryEconomy-FinalReport.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Id. The letter of endorsement, the report itself, the membership of the
Commission, and correspondence and reports can be found on the website for the
Commission at http://www.cotce.ca.gov/. The report is entitled "Commission on the 21st
Century Economy, Report, September 2009."
7. George Skelton, California Tax Reform Plan Much Too Bold For Capitol, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/Ol/local/me-capl.
8. Pomp's critiques can be found on the Commission's website. See his September
14 and September 25 postings. Letter from Richard Pomp, Commissioner, to the
Commission on the 21st Century Economy, (Sept 14, 2009 and Sept. 25, 2009) (hereinafter
Pomp Letter) http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/correspondence/staff and-commission ers/.
Fred Keeley also expressed strong reservations about the process, and he raised charges
that one of the Commissioners was in violation of the Open Meeting laws. See Calbuzz,
CB Excloo*: Did Tax Panel Break the Open Meeting Law? (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://www.calbuzz.com/2009/10/cb-excloo-did-tax-panel-break-open-meeting-law (last
visited Mar. 10, 2010).
9. See Skelton, supra note 7, at 1.
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proposal's components. 1° A letter sent to the Parsky Commission by
UCLA Professor Kirk Stark on behalf of nine prominent academic
legal and economic experts in state taxation questioned the wisdom of
adopting the untested BNRT."
Furthermore, a Field Poll found that the public was opposed to
the key Parsky Commission recommendations. 2 Sixty-four percent of
respondents disapproved of the personal income tax changes, in
particular, the proposal to raise the tax rate for lower income earners
and lower it for higher income earners.13 Sixty-six percent opposed
the Parsky Commission's key idea to introduce a new business tax to
replace the corporate tax and the state general sales tax.14 Ultimately,
while hearings were held by the Assembly Revenue and Taxation
Committee and later by the Senate Revenue and Taxation
Committee, no legislator introduced the bill for formal consideration.
The Parsky Commission's report effectively had no constituency in
Sacramento and, as a package, disappeared from serious
consideration.
While this outcome was disappointing to many members of the
Parsky Commission and its supporters, it raises some important
questions about the role of tax reform commissions in California.
First, what role have tax reform commissions played in California
history? Have they ever led to fundamental tax policy changes in the
state? Second, can tax reform commissions be said to "succeed" even
if their recommendations are only partially adopted? Third, what
were the causes of the most recent tax commission's apparent failure:
Was it due to the substance of the Parsky Commission's
recommendations, the process by which it operated, or both? And,
10. See Power Point, The California Budget Project, Fatally Flawed: What Would the
Commission On the 21st Century Economy's Recommendations Mean for California?
(Oct. 2009), available at http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2009/091007-Fatally-Flawed.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2010).
11. See Letter from Kirk Stark, Professor of Law, to Gerald Parsky, Chair of the
Commission on the 21st Century Economy (Sept. 5, 2009), (hereinafter Stark Letter)
available at http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/correspondence/public/documents/STAR
K9.5.09JointLettertoCaliforniaCommissionon21stCenturyEconomySeptember52009_.pd
f (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
12. California Opinion Index, State Constitutional Reform and Related Issues,
Volume 3, San Francisco: California, The Field Poll (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/COI-09-October-CA-ConstitutionReform.pdf.
13. California Opinion Index, Field Poll, October 2009, Table 8, available at
http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/COI-09-October-CA-Constitution-Reform.pdf
14. California Opinion Index, Field Poll, October 2009, Table 9, available at
http://www.field.com/fieldpollonfine/subscribers/COI-09-October-CA-Constitution-Reform.pdf
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finally, can this most recent experience point to new directions-even
if qualitatively different from the original recommendations-for
California tax policy?
To address these questions, this paper first looks back at two
important California tax commissions, the 1906 and 1929
Commissions, and places the results of their deliberations into the
history of taxation in California. The recommendations of both the
1906 and 1929 Commissions were largely adopted but only after some
modifications and, in the case of the 1929 Commission, considerable
fiscal turmoil. Despite these modifications, both can be deemed quite
successful in helping to set a new course for California fiscal history.
Two of the most dramatic changes in California tax history,
however, took place outside of formal tax commissions. The first, the
Riley-Stewart initiative, approved by voters in 1933, set the stage for
the modern California tax system.5 The second was the passage of
Proposition 13, which fundamentally altered the fiscal constraints
facing policymakers. This paper will briefly highlight the key
provisions of each and discuss how they changed the fiscal landscape.
Understanding the dynamics of these changes is essential to assessing
the role that tax commissions can play in political change. Tax
commissions always act in a larger context, particularly in California,
where initiatives have largely driven tax policy.
This paper then takes a close look at the recommendations and
operation of the Parsky Commission for the 21st Century Economy,
with particular focus on the difficulties associated with the BNRT and
the failure of the Parsky Commission to treat with sufficient care the
issue of the distribution of the tax burden.
Finally, this paper reviews the role that tax reform commissions
can play in the overall dialogue about fiscal policy in California. It
suggests that one positive, although unintended, outcome of the
Parsky Commission's report could be consideration of instituting
broader business taxes for California. However, unlike the scenario
envisioned in the Parsky Commission's report, these taxes would
likely be complements to, and not substitutes for, the current major
taxes in place today.
15. For an analysis of both the voting patterns and the long-term implications of
Riley-Stewart, see James E. Hartley, Steven M. Sheffrin & J. David Vasche, Reform
During Crisis: The Transformation of California's Fiscal System During the Great
Depression, 56 J. ECON. HIST. 657, 657-78 (1996).
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I. Two Successful Tax Commissions
California's first tax commission was formed in 1905 and filed its
report in 1906 ("1906 Commission"). The 1906 Commission's report
was received favorably by the Legislature and a constitutional
amendment incorporating its provisions was submitted to the voters
in 1908. The measure was defeated, but was reintroduced with slight
modifications and finally approved in 1910.16 The 1906 Commission
was formed to deal with what had been generally recognized as the
unsatisfactory state of property taxation in California. At that time,
both the state and local governments relied primarily on the property
tax to finance expenditures. The 1906 Commission identified a
number of difficulties with the system. It believed the burden on
agriculture was too high, the property tax unfairly fell primarily on
real estate as personal property, financial assets escaped assessment,
and the administration of the tax was highly inequitable.
One essential problem was that local assessors determined
valuations for both local and state property taxes. There was thus an
obvious incentive for local assessors to under-assess property so local
residents would pay less in state taxes. While the State Board of
Equalization in principle could have "equalized" assessments, in
practice this was ineffective. As a result, there were competitive
pressures to under-assess property across the state.17 The 1906
Commission echoed the general belief that the current system was
antiquated and needed to be replaced with something new.
The 1906 Commission's solution to the problem was the
"separation of sources," a radical division of state and local revenues.
Local governments would have complete access to the property tax.
However, "public utility property" such as railroads, gas and electric
companies, telephone and telegraph properties, and car and express
companies would be removed from local property tax rolls. These
utilities would not be subject to property taxation and instead would
be subject to a gross receipts tax the proceeds of which would accrue
solely to the state."
The gross receipts tax on public utility property would be
designed to approximate the burden placed on property in general
16. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORTS, VOL. 4, NO. 5, A RESUME OF
CALIFORNIA'S TAX STRUCTURE, 1850-1955: REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM
COMMITTEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, 26 (1956).
17. See 7 MARVEL M. STOCKWELL, STUDIES IN CALIFORNIA TAXATION 1910-1935,
ch. 1, 2 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1939).
18. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 16, at 23-24.
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throughout the state. Recognizing that gross receipts would bear a
different relationship to the capitalized value of net income for
different types of property, which the 1906 Commission took as a
proxy for the value of property, different classes of utility property
were to be assigned different gross receipts tax rates. However, the
aim was not to tax the value of transactions per se-as in modern
gross receipts taxes-but to use gross receipts to approximate a
property tax.' 9
The recommendations of the 1906 Commission transformed the
California tax system. Once this system was installed in 1910, it
stayed in place in California until 1933. However, some flaws in the
system were recognized in short time. A 1917 Tax Commission
("1917 Commission") highlighted the differences in effective property
tax rates engendered by the gross receipts tax across classes of utility
property and also within classes of property. For example, it found
that smaller firms within any class paid a higher rate of effective
taxation than larger firms. While the 1917 Commission believed that
the "separation of sources" was an improvement over the tax system
that was in place before 1910, it recommended changes to the rates
that applied to the different classes of utility companies and suggested
some other changes to the tax system as well.' Unlike its immediate
predecessor, the recommendations of the 1917 Commission were
largely ignored.
In contrast, the 1929 Tax Commission ("1929 Commission")
proved to be very influential. It began by reinforcing the conclusions
of the 1917 Commission-namely, that the system of gross receipts
taxation and separation of sources was broken.21 It pointed out some
of the same flaws that the prior commission had-unequal tax
burdens both across and within classes-but also pointed to an
essential absurdity of the system.2 Since gross receipts rates were
chosen simply to approximate property tax rates, why not tax
property directly? The 1929 Commission recommended that public
utility property be returned to local rolls and that the State Board of
19. The 1906 Commission engaged in some ingenious economic analysis. The tax rate
T for gross receipts for each class of property was given by the formula T = (N/i)*R where
N is the ratio of net income to gross receipts, i is an interest rate, and R is the state average
property tax rate. With this tax rate for gross receipts, total tax payments would equal the
capitalized income of an enterprise times the average tax rate for property in the state.
Since N differed across classes of property, so would T.
20. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 16, at 23-25.
21. Id. at 37-38.
22. Id. at 37-38.
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Equalization be given the role of assessing the property.2 That way,
local governments would enjoy the benefits of the property tax
revenue, but it would be assessed fairly at the state level.24
In the midst of the 1929 Commission's deliberations, California
was faced with a series of challenges to its system for taxing state
banks. In 1925, the state attempted to tax financial intangibles with
the Solvents Credit Act, but the banks successfully argued before the
courts that this created inequities, in that certain financial assets, such
as mortgages, were not subject to the tax. 25 The 1929 Commission was
asked to address this issue and developed an alternative approach to
bank taxation that would tax banks and all other corporations by
means of a franchise tax based on net income. 6 This approach
eventually became law.27
The 1929 Commission also sketched out a broad vision for a new
schema of taxation in California." It recognized that the obligations
the state was undertaking in 1929 were far more extensive than those
envisioned in 1906. State revenue under the "separation of sources"
plan depended primarily upon the revenues from the gross receipts
tax. However, that revenue stream was constrained by the property
tax rates chosen by localities, as the gross receipts tax was designed to
approximate the rate of local property taxation. Regardless of the
changing demands on the state, the revenue source was fixed. As a
consequence, the 1929 Commission understood that a new tax system
was needed.
The 1929 Commission envisioned three important components
for the California tax system. First, there was the property tax, which
would be focused primarily on real property and devoted to local
government.29  The "separation of sources" approach would be
abandoned. Second, there would be a tax on business based on each
business' net income, initially applied to corporations and banks but
perhaps later to unincorporated businesses, which would provide
23. Id. at 38.
24. Id. at 40-41.
25. FINAL REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA TAX COMMISSION 2 (1929).
26. Id. at 2, 250-64.
27. Id. at 2.
28. For a concise summary, see ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra
note 16, at 40-41. The 1929 Commission's complete proposals can be found at FINAL
REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA TAX COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 74-134.
29. FINAL REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA TAX COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 74-100.
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revenue for the state.3° Third, the 1929 Commission raised the idea of
a personal income tax to "personalize" the tax burden according to
the ability-to-pay principle." The personal income tax was necessary
because prior to this time, the property tax was effectively performing
two tasks. It was an objective tax on the value of property-a
reasonable measure of the benefits accruing to property from the
state-but it was also supposed to tax wealth on an ability-to-pay
rationale. Since property wealth was only a small part of total wealth,
however, and since voters were not truly interested in nor were fiscal
authorities capable of taxing intangible wealth, the property tax
performed poorly as a wealth tax. The 1929 Commission
recommended narrowing the scope of the property tax to real
property and introducing an income tax to address the ability-to-pay-
concerns 32
All three parts of this system were eventually adopted in the next
decade. The gross receipts tax and the separation of sources doctrine
ended in 1935 with the passage of the Riley-Stewart Amendment in
1933.33  The franchise tax on corporations, banks, and other
California-charted enterprises was adopted in 1929. It was later
reformed and complemented by a corporation income tax in 1937,
which taxed all corporations, regardless of their charter, on income
derived from California sources.34 Finally, a personal income tax was
passed by the Legislature in 1933. It was vetoed by Governor James
Rolph, but eventually became law in 1935."5
One of the reasons the 1929 Commission was both effective and
prophetic is that it had superb intellectual guidance from Professor
Robert Murray Haig of Columbia University, who was the advisor
and director of research. Professor Haig is known today for his
contributions to the theory of income taxation and the "Haig-
Simons" principle.36 The report reflects the institutional and strategic
vision for tax policy that Professor Haig brought to the 1929




33. See infra Section II (discussion of Riley-Stewart).
34. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITEE REPORTS, supra note 16, at 46-47.
35. Hartley, Sheffrin & Vasche, supra note 15, at 661.
36. For a discussion of the Haig-Simons principles, see JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC
FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 536-39 (2004).
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around the country and the strengths and weaknesses of various
taxes.
I. Two Fiscal Earthquakes: Riley-Stewart and Proposition 13
One phenomenon the 1929 Commission did not envisage was the
Great Depression. The 1930s was a time of great turmoil both in
terms of economics. and taxation. In particular, as incomes fell, the
relative burden of property taxes increased, which proved disastrous
for a fiscal system largely based on property taxation. Change was
inevitable and it came rapidly.
By the early 1930s, demands for property tax relief became
pronounced. As personal income fell during the depression, property
tax delinquencies rose in California, as they did throughout the
country. California experienced less severe problems, however, than
did many other jurisdictions. In Los Angeles County, for example,
the percentage of uncollected levies rose from 4.3 percent in 1931-32
to 10.1 percent in 1932-33. This was a far cry from the experience in
the Midwest, with a 37.6 percent rate in Milwaukee in 1931-32 and a
40.6 percent rate and widespread tax resistance in Chicago in 1931-
32." Nonetheless, persistent demands for property tax relief emerged
in California.
The primary demand was for increased state aid for elementary
and secondary schools, a policy that was recommended by the 1931
Legislative Tax Commission." Groups supporting property tax relief
and increased state aid placed an initiative, Proposition 9, on the
November 8, 1932 general election ballot. This initiative not only
provided property tax relief but also permitted the introduction of
personal income taxes and a sales tax. It was defeated by a nearly 2-1
vote.39
Early in the next year, Governor Rolph faced the first state fiscal
crisis of the depression. The governor's own proposals to deal with
the fiscal crisis were ignored, and the legislature worked through the
spring in fashioning both a budget and the language for the Riley-
Stewart initiative, named after State Controller Ray Riley and Board
of Equalization Member Fred Stewart.'
37. For data on property tax delinquencies, see TAX DIGEST, Jan. 1935, at 29.
38. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 16, at 43.
39. Hartley, Sheffrin & Vasche, supra note 15, at 660.
40. Id. at 668.
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The Riley-Stewart initiative, which the voters approved in a
special election on June 27, 1933, had four main components: public
utility property was to be returned to local property tax rolls and the
gross receipts tax abolished in 1935; the state would provide
additional support for elementary and secondary schools; limits were
placed on expenditure increases both at the state and local levels; and
the legislature was authorized to raise additional revenue to meet the
cost for school aid. The source of this revenue was not described in
the initiative, but it was generally acknowledged that a sales or
income tax would be necessary."
The amendment was presented to the voters as a way to end the
dependence on the property tax. The ballot measure in favor of the
amendment stated:
The ownership of property has become a liability and progress
towards recovery is impossible unless this is corrected at an
early date .... The entire structure of the State is based on
land values. Much of the difficulty that now confronts us is the
tremendous amount of frozen assets that can not be liquidated
because of the terrific burden of unsound and confiscatory
taxation.42
After the Riley-Stewart Amendment passed by nearly a two to one
margin, the legislature faced an enlarged state deficit from the
additional school aid. It quickly adopted a retail sales tax based on
New York's model and also passed a personal income tax.43 The
personal income tax bill was vetoed by the Governor. 44 There were
other revenue increases as well, but they were insufficient to cover
expenditures during the biennium, and the state fiscal situation
continued to deteriorate. In early 1935, Governor Frank Merriam
proposed an increase in taxes of $107 million that included instituting
a personal income tax and raising the sales tax rate from two percent
to three percent. The Legislature adopted these policies. After
introduction of the sales tax, the personal income tax, and the
41. Id.
42. The argument for the ballot measure for Riley-Stewart can be found on the site of
the University of California Hasting College of the Law Library. See PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION AND PROPOSITIONS 3 (June, 27 1933), available at
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1933s.pdf.
43. Hartley, Sheffrin & Vasche, supra note 15, at 661.
44. Id.
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franchise and corporation income taxes, the basic framework of
California taxation persisted for forty years.
The next major fiscal earthquake came directly from the grass
roots-Proposition 13. If deflation and falling incomes caused the
revolt against property taxes in the 1930s, the revolt in the 1970s was
due to the opposite phenomenon, inflation. To understand the
genesis of Proposition 13, it is necessary to understand how the
property tax system functioned in California prior to the decade-long
inflation of the 1970s. First, consider a system in which local
governments desire to raise a fixed amount of revenue to provide
local services-what economists call a revenue-based system. In this
system, it clearly would not matter whether properties are assessed at
100% of market value and taxed at a one percent rate or assessed at
fifty percent of market value and taxed at a two percent rate-in
either case, the revenue raised by local governments would be
identical, as the tax rate multiplied by the tax base (assessed value) is
the same. Under a revenue-based system, if assessments increase but
revenue needs stay the same, tax rates are reduced accordingly. In
contrast, in a tax-rate system, tax rates are fixed and thus changes in
assessments which change the tax base generate changes in revenues.
In a tax-rate system, tax rates are autonomous, unlike in a revenue-
based system.
As Isaac Martin effectively demonstrated, prior to Proposition
13, the fragmented structure of local government did not fit the model
of a revenue-based property tax system." Instead, it was closer to a
tax-rate based system, in which increases in assessed value lead to
higher revenues, at least over short periods of time. Martin showed
that as property values rose rapidly in the 1970s as part of the general
inflationary environment of the decade, the property tax system
experienced stress. Within each county there were multiple
authorities with the power to raise or lower tax rates-city and county
governments, school districts, and multiple special districts-as well
as independently elected assessors. There was no overall
coordination between these multiple authorities. In principle,
political authorities could have lowered tax rates as assessments
increased, but they failed to do so in a timely manner. Thus, as
inflation rose and the assessors reassessed properties on differing
time frames and with different methodologies, the result was a sharp
45. See ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: How THE
PROPERTY TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS (2008).
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increase in tax bills and a shift of the tax burden on homeowners.
These increases and shifts in the tax burden, often idiosyncratic and
unpredictable, drove the passion of the tax revolts 6
In particular, there was a clear shift away from taxation on
commercial and industrial property to taxation of homeowners.
Across taxing jurisdictions, assessors varied in how frequently they re-
assessed properties. The birth of mass appraisals for single-family
properties through regression techniques led to more rapid re-
assessments which, in turn, created more inequities across
jurisdictions as well as between properties within jurisdictions. This
system, which worked effectively when there was little inflation, failed
miserably when inflation became a predominant feature of the
economic landscape. When inflation was low, political jurisdictions
had sufficient time to adjust tax rates to avoid disrupting the existing
tax shares paid by various properties and interests. But when
inflation accelerated, time was compressed, and the political system
was simply unable to cope with the rapid changes.47
When Proposition 13 was passed by the voters in 1978, it
fundamentally changed the fiscal landscape in California. Extensive
analysis of the fiscal effects of Proposition 13 on the state as well as
local governments has been published elsewhere, and a full analysis is
beyond the scope of this paper.48 However, a few key points are
relevant here. In retrospect, what is striking is how many of the
concerns echoed those of the Riley-Stewart amendment. First and
foremost, Proposition 13 reduced the tax burden on property by
responding directly to voters' concerns about a perceived
unsustainable tax burden.49 Secondly, Proposition 13 changed the
relationship between state and local governments and effectively
reduced the autonomy of local governments, with the state now
taking a leading role in financing elementary and secondary
education.' Third, Proposition 13 reduced total state and local
revenues and placed an additional revenue burden on the state."
Unlike Riley-Stewart, no new taxes were implemented immediately-
46. Id. at 6-10.
47. See Steven Sheffrin, Review of The Permanent Tax Revolt: How the Property Tax
Transformed American Politics, 86:1 CAL. HIST. 72 (2008) (book review).
48. See, e.g., ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN, TERRI A. SEXTON & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN,
PROPERTY TAXES AND TAX REVOLTS: THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13 (1995).
49. Id. at 1-5.
50. Id. at 103-04.
51. Id. at 97-98.
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although cities and counties began to increase their fees and charges
to offset some of the loss in property tax revenues. 2 Over time,
however, the state became increasingly reliant on the personal
income tax to finance the state budget-an issue addressed by the
Parsky Commission.
There is one final, important similarity between Riley-Stewart
and Proposition 13. Riley-Stewart's expenditure limitations required
a two-thirds vote of the legislature for a budget if appropriations
exceeded five percent of prior year spending. 3 This provision is
regarded as the beginning of the two-thirds voting requirement to
pass a budget in force today. 4 In 1962, the references to the five
percent appropriation limit were deleted from the state constitution
by Proposition 16, leaving the two-thirds voting requirement in
place.5 Proposition 13 is the genesis of the two-thirds vote for tax
increases in the state legislature and for special districts at the local
level 6 Both measures aimed to constrain future tax increases either
through budgetary control or direct control over taxes. In the
author's view, they were both fueled by populist sentiments that were
suspicious of larger government 7
A ballot argument in favor of Proposition 13 from State Senator
John Briggs conveys this populist flavor: "What Ronald Reagan
describes as the 'spenders coalition' of spendthrift politicians and
powerful special interests are spending millions to defeat Proposition
13.... More than 15% of all government spending is wasted!"58
These comments echo much popular sentiment to this day that state
and local government budgets can be reduced without sacrificing the
52. Id. at 98.
53. DAVID R. DOERR, CALIFORNIA'S TAX MACHINE: A HISTORY OF TAXING AND
SPENDING IN THE GOLDEN STATE 40 (2d ed. 2008). See also Fred Silva, California's Two-
Thirds Legislative Vote Requirement and Its Role in the State Budget Process, WESTERN
CITY MAGAZINE, LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES (Nov. 2008), available at
http://www.cacities.org/index.jsp?zone=wcm&previewStory=27483#.
54. Id. at 40.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 176-77.
57. Evidence for this position is found in the ballot measure discussed in the next
paragraph.
58. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION 57 (1978),
http://traynor.uchastings.eduballot-pdf/1978p.pdf.
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quality of government programs. UC Berkeley political scientist Jack
Citrin has made these same points repeatedly. 9
HI. The Parsky Commission Report
The primary mission of the Parsky Commission, as established
by its animating Executive Order, was to address the volatility of
California's tax system."' The Executive Order mentions other issues,
including the changing nature of the economy and the need for better
incentives to strengthen the economy and generate revenue, but its
emphasis was on volatility.6' This focus on volatility is somewhat
unusual. While governments typically favor stable revenue sources,
economists recognize that volatile government revenue streams mean
less volatile income streams for households and firms. 6 The principle
of "automatic stabilizers" in macroeconomics is based on this
premise.63
Volatility became an issue largely for reasons of political
economy. The rationale is that politicians are unable to resist
spending tax revenue during good times, thereby locking the state
into an unsustainable expenditure pattern. A downturn will then
plunge the state into a fiscal crisis. This was the critique of the fiscal
woes prevailing under Governor Gray Davis. 6 Despite recognizing
this problem, Governor Schwarzenegger viewed himself powerless to
change it, and he continued to run structural budget deficits after
succeeding Governor Davis. 65  Relatively buoyant economic times
and clever budget gimmicks concealed the structural deficit, but it
59. For a recent statement, see Jack Citrin, Proposition 13 and the Transformation of
California Government, 1:1 CAL. J. POL. & POL'Y (2009), available at http://www.bepress.
com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=cjpp.
60. See Exec. Order No. S-15-09, (July 29, 2009), available at http://www.gov.ca.gov/
executive-order/12921/ (the Governor's Executive Order S-15-09 forming the Commission).
61. Commission Report, op cit, pp. i-ii.
62. ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN, STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN & STEPHEN J. PEREZ,
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, APPLICATIONS, AND TOOLS 222-23 (6th ed. 2009).
63. Id. States as well as the federal government can provide automatic stabilizers.
64. See Steven Sheffrin, State Budget Deficit Dynamics and the California Debacle, 18
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE 205-26 (Spring 2004).
65. For a representative assessment, see Dan Walters, Governor Yet To Do What He
Promised, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 2, 2010, available at http://www.fresnobee.com/columnists/
waiters/ story/1767634.html.
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dramatically re-emerged during the most recent financial and
economic crisis.'
In retrospect, the strong emphasis on volatility predetermined
the direction of the Parsky Commission's recommendations. Over
time, California has become increasingly reliant on the personal
income tax ("PIT") as the primary funding source for the state
general fund. In 2007-08, the PIT provided fifty-three percent of the
general fund.67 Because California includes capital gains and stock
options as part of the personal income tax base, this component of the
revenue stream is highly volatile.6 Furthermore, the lion share of the
PIT revenue originates from the very top of the income distribution-
in 2006, the top one percent of taxpayers comprised twenty-five
percent of adjusted gross income but forty-eight percent of personal
income tax revenues. 69  Consequently, an obvious "solution" to
California's volatility problem was to reduce reliance on the PIT
either through changing the treatment of capital gains and stock
options or through lowering personal income tax rates. The Parsky
Commission chose the latter course.7 0 But how would such a change
be financed and how would the Parsky Commission deal with the
obvious distributional issues?
The key recommendations of the Parsky Commission affecting
tax revenues consisted of four components. First, there were personal
income tax reductions. The Parsky Commission proposed reducing
the number of tax brackets to two-a 2.75% rate up to $60,000 in
taxable income and a 6.5% rate above that-with a standard
deduction of $45,000.71 Deductions were allowed only for mortgage
interest, charitable contributions, and property taxes. Second, the
state portion of the general sales tax was eliminated. 3 Third, the
66. MAC TAYLOR, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, THE 2010-11
BUDGET: CALIFORNIA'S FISCAL OUTLOOK 3-10 (Nov. 2009), http://lao.ca.gov/2009/bud/
fiscaloutlook/fiscaloutlook_111809.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
67. COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 14.
68. See ELIZABETH G. HILL, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE,
REVENUE VOLATILITY IN CALIFORNIA 8-10 (Jan. 2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/
revvol/rev-volatility_012005.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
69. COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 18.
70. Id. at 41-43.
71. Id. at 43.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 44.
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corporation tax was eliminated.74 Finally, there would be a new tax-
the Business Net Receipts Tax ("BNRT").
75
These proposals, if implemented, would have brought sweeping
and dramatic changes to California's tax system. The personal
income tax reductions, the elimination of the state general sales tax,
and the elimination of the state corporate income tax all would have
sharply reduced revenue.76 The new BNRT was designed to make up
the revenue shortfall and maintain overall revenue neutrality in the
process.77
What exactly is the BNRT? It is a tax that would be applied to
the "net receipts" of a business, consisting of gross receipts minus
purchases of goods and services from other firms, including
investment goods.8 By allowing a full deduction for investment
goods, it was designed to be a consumption-based value-added tax.79
The BNRT would be imposed on all business entities, not just
corporations-including flow-through entities such as S-Corporations,
partnerships of all types, and sole proprietorships.8 In terms of
implementation, it would use combined reporting and the unitary
business principle, familiar from California's current corporate
income tax, but limit its application to the "water's edge."8  The
BNRT would be apportioned to the State of California by the use of a
destination sales factor.8 The nexus rules, which dictate whether
74. Id. at 43-44.
75. Id. at 44-46.
76. COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY, COMMISSION TAX PROPOSAL
(Sept. 29, 2009) (hereinafter COMMISSION TAX PROPOSAL) http://www.cotce.ca.gov/
documents/reports/documents/FinalReport-Presentation.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
77. Id.
78. Appendix to the COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY, supra note 4,
at A3-A12.
79. Id. at A4.
80. Id. at A5.
81. Id. at A6. "Water's edge" means that the tax applies only to companies operating
within the United States, although there are exceptions to handle complex entities related
to trade promotion or sheltered income. See California Taxpayer Association, "The Role
of the Water's Edge Election in California's Unitary Taxation Method," available at
http://www.caltax.org/issues/legislation/WatersEdgeUnitaryTax.pdf. For a detailed des-
cription, see California Franchise Tax Board's Water's Edge Manual, http://www.ftb.
ca.gov/aboutFTB/manuals /audit/water/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
82. Appendix to the COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY, supra note 4,
at A7-A8.
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California has jurisdiction to tax a business, would be based on the
presence of payroll, property, or sales in the state. 3
As soon as the BNRT was announced, it began to draw
considerable attention. A letter addressed to the Parsky Commission
from the nine academic tax lawyers and economists highlighted a
number of key problems with the tax:
(1) Unlike a European credit-invoice tax, it would penalize firms
exporting from California and not be purely a consumption tax, but in
part a tax on production.
(2) The expansive nexus provisions, designed to capture firms
selling into California from outside the state, would be the subject of
considerable and unpredictable legal controversy. Would the tax be
viewed as a sales tax and thus subject to the restrictions imposed by
Quill v. North Dakota, or would it be considered an income tax,
subject to the restrictions of PL 82-272? 8  In either case,
overextending the reach of the tax would subject it to considerable
legal risk.
(3) The BNRT would create incentives to substitute independent
contractors for employees, as payments for independent contractors
were deductible, unlike compensation of employees. Similarly, there
would be incentives to engage in transactions with firms outside the
reach of the tax, such as firms beyond the "water's edge" or having no
nexus with California.
(4) As a new tax, the BNRT would be subject to additional
potential gaming, again in unpredictable ways.
Based on these concerns, the experts viewed the sweeping
implementation of the BNRT and replacement of other taxes as too
risky.85
In subsequent testimony and discussion, many other concerns
were raised. The BNRT was only designed to replace the general
state sales tax, but not the state portion of the sales tax devoted to
transportation or local sales taxes.86 Eliminating the state portion of
the general sales tax would create administrative complications for
83. Id. at A5.
84. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1991) (placing limits on the ability of states
to collect tax from out-of-state sellers); Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555-56 (1959) (limiting
states' ability to tax the income of out-of-state sellers who simply solicited the market in
another state).
85. Stark Letter, supra note 11.
86. Steven Sheffrin, Testimony at the California State Assembly Revenue and
Taxation Committee (Oct. 14, 2009), (hereinafter Sheffrin Testimony) available at
http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/ newcomframeset.asp ?committee=21.
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the state. Either cities, counties, and special districts would have to
create their own duplicative administrative structures to manage the
sales tax or rely on a state government that would have virtually no
long-term interest in managing this revenue source.87 Either of these
changes would inevitably lead to reduced efforts in auditing,
monitoring, and enforcing existing laws. In addition, the changes
would hamper efforts to modernize the sales tax, such as through the
Streamlined Sales Tax Project.88 Absent a system that encourages
strong state interest, sales tax administration would likely be
balkanized across counties, with the consequence of spreading
anachronistic practices imposing additional compliance costs on
businesses. Once the state no longer receives ongoing revenue from
the sales tax, it cannot be counted on to provide necessary oversight
for local taxes, as it does now.
The Parsky Commission in its own report bemoaned the fact that
the existing corporate tax was expensive to administer because the
current system requires: First, that corporate income be apportioned
between California and jurisdictions outside of California and second,
under California law, that the corporate tax be calculated by
apportioning the income of combinations of corporations that form a
unitary group.89 Perhaps the Parsky Commission had not considered
this part of their report when they proposed the BNRT. Except for
details in the calculation of the tax base, the BNRT looks exactly like
a state corporation tax. However, the BNRT expanded the scope of
these identical provisions-apportionment and combination-to all
business entities of sufficient size, not just corporations. This would
sharply expand the number of taxpayers subject to the rather intricate
rules of apportionment, business and non-business income, and
combination, as well as the unitary business principle. It is well
known that issues of combination and the determination of whether
entities are part of a unitary group are often most difficult for smaller
business entities. 90 Many court cases document the difficulty of
making unitary determinations in these settings. 9' Flow-through
entities such as LLCs, LLPs, S-corporations, partnerships, and sole
proprietorships would test the limits of the unitary business principle
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 21-23.
90. Id. at A7-A8.
91. Sheffrin Testimony, supra note 86.
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and the additional compliance burden would be significant. It can
also be anticipated that many of these flow-through entities would be
created and designed explicitly to test the limits of the reach of the
BNRT by either exploiting nexus limitations or by locating outside
the "water's edge" reach of the tax.
Some commentators were also concerned that any proposed new
tax would quickly be attacked by lobbyists and special interests,
particularly because its underlying theoretical basis is not clear.
92
There is much to be said in favor of the maxim that an "old tax is a
good tax." Moving away from familiar taxes whose parameters have
been established through litigation to a new and untested tax would
create additional uncertainty for firms and increase lobbying and
rent-seeking on the part of special interests. The Parsky
Commission's own recommendation for a Research and
Development credit, despite virtually no evidence on its current
efficacy as part of the Corporation Income Tax, as well as possible
deductions for employee health insurance, previewed the types of
interventions that could be expected.93 One would also anticipate
strong pressure from labor interests to push for deductibility of some
forms of employee compensation, particularly if outsourcing becomes
an important consideration. As a result of the inevitable changes that
would be introduced to get the tax enacted, firms considering
investing in California will not be able to count on a stable framework
for taxation. This additional uncertainty could easily act as a punitive
"tax" on doing business in California.
Modern tax reform proposals almost always contain a clear
discussion of the distributional aspects of the tax.94 This was a glaring
omission from the Parsky Commission's report. The report itself did
not discuss the changes in tax burden associated with the proposed
tax changes and only implied that the new tax preserved the same
degree of progressivity.95  Only by looking at a PowerPoint
presentation prepared by the Parsky Commission could one detect its
92. Pomp Letter, supra note 8.
93. Letter from George Halvorson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Kaiser
Permanente, to the Honorable Gerald Parsky, Chair, and Commissioners, California
Commission on the 21st Century Economy (Sept. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.cotce.ca.gov/ documents/correspondence/staff and commissioners/.
94. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE,
FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 19-40 (Nov.
2005), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/final-report/TaxPane1l-1l-l.pdf (last
visited Mar. 21, 2010).
95. COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 42.
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claim that the proposal would shift an additional $6.8 billion of taxes
to the federal government or non-residents. 96 The additional part
absorbed by the federal government became known as the "federal
offset." 97  The Parsky Commission's claim was based on an
unpublished report from Ernst & Young LLP and on a later overview
written by the Parsky Commission staff, but was supported by no
evidence in the report itself.98 The claim is premised on the idea that
the BNRT would be deductible from the federal income tax.99
Why was this claim about shifting the burden of the tax to the
federal government or non-residents important? If some or all of. the
$6.8 billion was not shifted to the federal government or non-
residents, then a substantial portion of the non-shifted tax would
likely be borne by consumers or workers in California. This result is
what one would normally expect from the Parsky Commission's
proposal to shift from income taxes toward taxes more closely aligned
with consumption. This would have the effect of shifting the overall
burden of taxation in California from groups earning above $100,000
to those earning below $100,000 and would certainly not be a
distributionally neutral tax change.'°°
Although economists disagree on many things, they do agree that
assessing the ultimate burden of taxation is an extremely difficult
matter and depends upon the assumptions built into the analysis.101 It
appears, however, that the methods employed by the staff and their
consultants did not fully take into account how changes in tax
structure will, even at a first approximation, affect baseline taxable
incomes.
For example, simply replacing a retail sales tax with a receipts-
based tax like the BNRT would increase firms' taxable incomes along
with their deductions and not lead to any additional federal tax
deductions or "federal offset." To see this, suppose that a product
sold for $100 before tax and that a six percent sales tax was imposed.
96. COMMISSION TAX PROPOSAL, supra note 76.
97. See Ernst & Young, LLP, Analysis of the Incidence of Selected Tax Proposals
Prepared for the California Commission on the 21st Century Economy (Sept. 25, 2009)
(on file at Institute of Governmental Affairs Library, UC Davis, Davis Ca. 95616); see also
Report from the staff of the Commission, Commission on the 21" Century Economy
Commission Tax Proposal: Outline of Incidence and Distributional Analysis, (on file at
Institute of Governmental Affairs Library, UC Davis, Davis Ca. 95616) (undated).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. COMMISSION TAX PROPOSAL, supra note 76.
101. See O'SULLIVAN, SHEFFRIN & PEREZ, supra note 62, at 476-80.
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If the cost of the tax was shifted to consumers, prices would rise to
$106, with the firm turning over $6 to the government, leaving its net
sales at $100. Now, replace the sales tax with a six percent receipts
tax. Prices still rise to $106 as before but now the firm's total receipts
are the full $106. The firm is allowed a $6 deduction, leaving its net
sales exactly at $100 as before. Just because firms can deduct the
business net receipts tax from their income does not mean that they
shift any of its burdens to the federal government.
At best, the Parsky Commission's claim that the changes are
distributionally neutral-again, not discussed explicitly in the
report-were unproven. As a result, the public's general impression
was that the BNRT was in large part financing substantial tax cuts for
the highest income levels in California.'9 Of the approximately $14
billion in personal income tax reductions, $4 billion went to those
with annual incomes over $1 million and $9.5 billion to those with
annual incomes exceeding $100,000.'03 The Parsky Commission failed
to meets its burden of proving that imposition of the BNRT would
offset these obvious tax decreases for the wealthy.
In summary, the Parsky Commission's report came under attack
because it relied heavily on a new and untested tax to replace well-
established existing taxes, paid insufficient consideration to long-term
administrative issues, and failed to deal in an adequate manner with
the changes to the distribution of the tax burden. The novelty of the
tax disturbed many. Currently only Michigan has a similar tax, but it
imposes a rate of 0.8% on "modified gross receipts" and is fully
integrated with a more traditional business income tax of 4.95% that
applies to all business entities."' But Michigan only recently adopted
this tax as a replacement for its earlier Single Business Tax, another
type of value-added state tax.05  There has not been sufficient
experience to judge the proposed tax's economic impact and
administrative effects, experience necessary to create comfort with
such a radical change.
102. See Jean Ross, Cal. Budget Project, COTCE Proposals Would Increase Budget
Gaps, Tax Low- and Middle-income Californians (2009), http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2009/
CalifomiaBudgetBites/090911_CBP Analysis Cotce-proposals.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
103. COMMISSION TAX PROPOSAL, supra note 76.
104. Sheffrin Testimony, supra note 86.
105. Id.
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IV. Looking Back and Looking Ahead
In its Summary of Recommendations, the 1929 Commission
prefaced its specific recommendations with the comment, "Such a
system would comprehend no measures which have not been
thoroughly tested by experience in other states."' '  The Parsky
Commission, with its relatively short time frame, did not have the
luxury or inclination to thoroughly examine the practices of other
states, instead choosing to go forward with an untested tax which
would raise so much revenue that it would require abolishing the
corporate tax and the general state sales tax while financing dramatic
reductions in personal income taxes. This approach inevitably
generated strong reactions. The Parsky Commission did not have the
time or budget to prepare detailed and in-depth studies, such as those
represented in the twelve volumes of the Assembly's Major Tax
Study from 19 63 -65 .'07 Apparently neither state governments nor tax
commissions are as reflective as they were in the 1960s.
As previously noted, the Parsky Commission's instruction to
focus on the "volatility" in the California tax system largely dictated
its final conclusions. But volatility is an abstract concept and not one
that connects with ordinary voters. The two successful tax
commissions, as well as the Riley-Stewart Amendment and
Proposition 13, operated on a more fundamental level, responding
directly to voter's' concerns. Both tax commissions focused on
property taxes, which directly impinged upon the welfare of citizens.
The 1906 Commission focused on inequities across jurisdictions, while
the 1929 Commission focused on inequities across both jurisdictions
and firms. These inequities translated directly into tax bills. The two
successful voter initiatives, Riley-Stewart and Proposition 13, both
promised tax relief for voters.
The two earlier tax commissions were also forward looking in
terms of envisioning the relationships between local governments and
the state. Both commissions recognized that the state needed its own
source of revenue distinct from local government; this was the genesis
of the "separation of sources" in 1906 and the proposals for a net
income tax on corporations and banks in 1929.1° In contrast, the
Parsky Commission largely neglected local government and, indeed,
106. FINAL REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA TAX COMMISSION, supra note 25, at xxi.
107. DOERR, supra note 53, at 708.
108. See discussion infra Section II.
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left local governments with the remainder of an eviscerated sales tax,
having given no thought to longer term administrative issues.
A successful tax reform commission or a successful movement to
change the tax structure in California should heed the lessons of
California history. It should deal with perceived inequities that
concern taxpayers and should understand the changing role that the
state government plays in the constantly evolving state-local and even
state-federal relationship. Finally, it must find some way to resonate
with public sentiments of a populist nature.
Other constraints will naturally limit the scope of any feasible tax
reform. Despite its well-known inequities, the post-Proposition 13
taxation system for residential property is highly regarded by voters. 1°9
It is not possible to reinstitute the pre-1978 local government tax
structure. The state will continue to play a controlling role in local
finance. The state will face other increasing burdens, as the federal
government forces it to take a greater role in heath care through
expansions of Medicaid.
110
With these constraints in mind, I offer for consideration two
proposals: a reform of the system of property taxation for commercial
and industrial property and a new broad-based business tax. The first
proposal addresses the issue of perceived inequities in the tax system,
while the second recognizes the additional and growing
responsibilities undertaken by the state and the need for a new
revenue source.
A. Taxing Commercial and Industrial Property at Market Value
The first proposal recommends taxing commercial and industrial
properties at their current market values, as opposed to the modified
acquisition value of Proposition 13. It is unfortunate that the so-
called "split roll" has become such a political lightning rod because it
has a strong intellectual basis and could raise substantial revenue
without creating great economic dislocations.' My recommendation
109. See Steven M. Sheffrin, Re-Thinking the Fairness of Proposition 13, in AFTER THE
TAX REVOLT: CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 13 TURNS 30, 117-32 (Jack Citrin & Isaac
William Martin eds., 2009).
110. President Obama's health proposal would require additional state funding for
Medicaid. See Stu Woo, Schwarzenegger Airs Medicaid Cost Concern, But Still Backs
Action, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2009, at A5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125
666629178410871.html.
111. Steven Sheffrin, Economic Aspects of a Split-Roll Property Tax (2009), available
at http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/reports/documentsfEconomicAspectsofASplit.pdf/
(last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
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is that the one percent tax rate be maintained for commercial and
industrial property, but that those properties are assessed at their
current market value on a yearly basis. The increased revenue from
this change is subject to some uncertainty, but most estimates today
fall in the $4 billion to $7 billion range on an annual basis."2 Previous
work has demonstrated the gross inequities caused by Proposition 13
for commercial and industrial properties, with the greatest
beneficiaries being the largest firms.'13
Taxing commercial and industrial property at market value is not
the same as simply raising the tax rate. If the tax rate were increased,
both buyers and sellers would rationally pay less for property, and
property values would fall. However, under Proposition 13, buyers of
properties pay taxes on the sale price-that is, the current market
value."' Property prices will reflect what the buyer demands, not the
tax-advantages enjoyed by long-time holders of property, who
constitute a minority of property holders, and not the "marginal"
seller."5 The tax advantages of the long-term property owners are not
transferrable and will not affect market price.
Of course, ending the acquisition value treatment for commercial
and industrial property would mean that commercial and industrial
property owners currently enjoying tax-favored treatment would pay
more in taxes. But these taxes would not affect their marginal
incentives to invest-as all new investment pays property taxes at
current market value. The increased tax payments would be
equivalent to a capital-levy on firms for their under-assessed
property. Shareholders or owners of the property would pay more
tax, but it would have minimal effects on economic efficiency.
Indeed, the only possible disadvantage to new purchasers would
occur if future price increases for property exceed two percent a
year.'1 6 However, this result is unlikely in the near future, and the
effects on the cost of new investment would be minimal.
It is true that county assessors would have increased workload
and would need to be compensated for their extra work. However, a
112. Terri A. Sexton & Steven M. Sheffrin, The Market Value of Commercial Real
Property in Los Angeles County in 2002, 28 STATE TAX NOTES MAGAZINE 85-89 (2003),
available at http://www.iga.ucdavis.edu/Research/CSLT/Publications/MarketValueComm
ercialRealPropertyPaper.pdf.
113. O'SULLIVAN, SHEFFRIN & PEREZ, supra note 62, at 55-70.
114. Id. at 5-6.
115. SHEFFRIN, supra note 111.
116. Id.
[Vol. 37:4
very small fraction of the additional revenue could finance this added
expense.'17 Only California extends acquisition-value treatment to
non-homeowners; other states restrict it to homeowners."' Whether
rental property or single-family non-homeowner property should still
retain acquisition-value protection would have to be determined
before bringing this issue to the voters.
B. A Broad-Base, Low-Rate Source Tax
Let me now turn to my second proposal. Following the lead of
the Parsky Commission, it is worthwhile to consider a broad-base tax
that touches all segments of the economy and all types of enterprises.
The Parsky Commission's proposal did reach a new range of lightly-
taxed businesses-importantly-the service industry. It was the
Parsky Commission's judgment that it would be difficult to reach the
service sector through legislation reforming the sales tax.9 Although
other states, for example Texas, have extended the reach of the sales
tax to include a myriad of services, attempts to extend it broadly in a
single legislative package-such as in Florida and Massachusetts-
were not successful. 2° Thus, the Parsky Commission deemed it
worthwhile to consider a broad-based tax as an alternative.
My proposal differs from the BNRT proposed by the Parsky
Commission in important ways. Specifically, I recommend that
California consider a low-rate, less than one percent, source-based tax
for all businesses with a base composed of economic value-added: the
sum of compensation, interest, and depreciation. Let's call this the
BBT, the business benefit tax, and its rationale would be that all
businesses in California enjoy the benefits of the state's economic and
legal system.
In economics tax-jargon, the proposed tax is a source-based,
addition method, income value-added tax. It would apply to all
117. See CAL. ASSESSOR'S ASS'N, SPLIT ROLL-SPLIT RATE INITIATIVES WHITE
PAPER (2005), http://www.calassessor.org/positions/split%20roll.pdf (last visited Mar. 21,
2010) (providing an estimate of additional administrative expenses).
118. O'SULLIVAN, SHEFFRIN & PEREZ, supra note 62, at 15-38.
119. The Commission was aware that piecemeal revisions had been discussed in
earlier years, but stated that there was a sense of "urgency" to their deliberations which
required bold action. Press Release, California Commission on the 21st Century, supra
note 2, at 3.
120. For a discussion by former Executive Director of the Federation of Tax
Administrators for the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, see Harley Duncan,
Fed'n of Tax Admin., Federal Tax Reform and State Taxes (2005), http://www.taxadmin.
org/fta/rate/taxreformpanel.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
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businesses (including corporations, partnerships, and sole
proprietorships) and would utilize combined-reporting, with the tax
apportioned to California ideally based on payroll, property, and
possibly also by sales. These apportionment factors are chosen to
reflect that the tax is based on value-added generated in California.
Value-added consists of compensation and capital income, so it is
natural to apportion it by payroll and property measures. A sales
factor could be included in the apportionment schema, as businesses
selling into the state from outside still enjoy the benefits of the
market. However, introduction of a sales factor into what is
essentially a value-added tax does raise the peculiarities that were
addressed in Trinova v. Michigan Department of Treasury.
121
In its combined report, a business would start with net income
and add back in compensation of employees and depreciation. Non-
profits and government entities would be subject to the tax; however,
the tax rate would only apply to their compensation. This would
place non-profits and profit-making firms on a roughly equal footing.
This is important for the health care and educational industries.
Unlike the BNRT, it would not attempt to reach out-of-state
taxpayers through an aggressive sales-only apportionment factor or
through the use of a risky theory of nexus as the basis of the tax.
Instead, it is designed to be a fair, broad-based tax based on the
benefit principle. The tax base-income value-added-is perhaps the
best measure to capture the benefits that accrue to businesses
operating in California.' This tax is not designed to be a
consumption tax because capital purchases are not deducted from the
tax base. Thus, the BBT is not designed as a replacement for the
sales tax. Again, this is an important difference from the BNRT.
The BBT could be designed as an addition to California's
existing taxes and not necessarily as a substitute. All taxes cause
distortions and source-based taxes in open economies can cause
disincentives for businesses and workers.' 23 But the rate proposed
121. Trinova Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358 (1991). In that case, the
taxpayer, Trinova Corporation, demonstrated that its payroll and property were
predominately located in Ohio, but the sales factor has the effect of bringing a large part
of its tax base into Michigan. While the Supreme Court did allow the use of a three-factor
formula in this case, using payroll and property as the primary factors avoids this problem. Id.
122. George Zodrow, Revenue Options for the State of Texas, 34 STATE TAX NOTES
MAGAZINE 799-821 (2004).
123. See Steven Sheffrin, Book Review: State Sales and Income Taxes, 53 NAT'L TAX J.
965 (2000) (book review) (reviewing GEORGE ZODROW, STATE SALES TAXES AND
INCOME TAXES (1999)).
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would be very low and reach sectors that are currently very lightly
taxed-for example, services. If the BBT proved to bring in sufficient
revenues, it could be used to finance reductions in the personal
income tax, the sales tax, or the existing corporation tax, alleviating
some of these distortions.
Conclusion
The 1929 Commission report did consider favorably the
possibility of a low-rate broad-based tax reaching non-incorporated
businesses.124 Today, these entities are even more important in the
functioning of the economy. The 1929 Commission did not ultimately
include this plan in its final recommendations but did raise it as a
viable possibility.125 Eighty years later, the idea of a low-rate broad-
based tax on a stable base as an important source of revenue for the
state is worth reconsidering.
With the exception of the reform of the bank tax during the
deliberations of the 1929 Commission, all of the recommendations of
prior commissions took a number of years to become effective. The
recommendations of the 1906 Commission were enacted through the
passage of Amendment 1 in 1910.126 The recommendations of the
1929 Commission were tentatively rejected by a legislative committee
in 1931 that wished to refine, but not eliminate, the gross receipts tax
and the separation of sources. But Riley and Stewart drew upon the
work of the 1929 Commission for their initiative. It is unlikely the
Parsky Commission's recommendation will surface again in the near
future, given its initial reception. But despite the Parsky
Commission's intentions, it may have planted the seeds for a broad-
based business tax to supplement state revenue.
What is missing from the two proposals suggested here-the
reform of the property tax for commercial and industrial property and
a new broad-based origin-based value-added tax-is a mechanism to
tie it to the voters' ongoing concerns. In the past, major changes have
always been tied to populist concerns while limiting the scope and
reach of government. Finding convincing mechanisms for limiting
government in a context where the responsibilities of state
government have increased is a challenging task. Even the far-
sighted ideas of the 1929 Commission needed the populist spirit of
124. FINAL REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA TAX COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 79-80.
125. Id.
126. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 16, at 26.
127. STOCKWELL, supra note 17, at 4-5.
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Riley-Stewart, including the expenditure limitations that evolved into
the two-thirds voting requirement for budget passage, to eventually
be enacted into law. Good ideas require political passion in order to
become law.
